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CYBERSECURITY AND TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE STATE OF THE ART

Chimene I. XKeitner t & Harry L. Clark TT

I.

Introduction

Virtually without exception, conducting business across borders today means being
connected to the Internet. The U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which is
awaiting implementation by Congress, would become the first operative United States free trade
agreement to include a chapter devoted to "digital trade."' The USMCA provisions on digital trade
build on the electronic commerce chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP, now CPTPP)-a
multilateral trade agreement that the Obama Administration negotiated, but the Trump
Administration rejected.2 As the United States continues to negotiate the conditions for its bilateral
trade relationships, cybersecurity concerns are likely to feature in the discussions.
As a general matter, trade agreements seek to reduce barriers to cross-border trade. The
prospect of negotiating a trade agreement can be used as a "carrot" in foreign relations, whereas
punitive measures such as sanctions and tariffs are used as "sticks." Meanwhile, growing concerns
about cybersecurity and the perceived risks posed by foreign technology and foreign control over
data create pressures for more trade-restrictive arrangements. This essay examines provisions
relating to digital trade and cybersecurity against the backdrop of these potentially competing
interests. We begin by describing current efforts to address cybersecurity-related concerns in trade
treaties, with a focus on the USMCA. Next, we address concerns at the intersection of
cybersecurity and national security. Third, we identify an apparent trend towards company-specific

T Alfred & Hanna Fromm Professor of International Law, UC Hastings Law School; inaugural Orrick Scholar-inResidence, Summer 2018.
t Partner & Chair of International Trade & Compliance Group, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP.
1 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, Nov. 30, 2018; see Roy Blunt, USMCA: Where Things Stand, SENATEREPUBLICANPOL'Y COMM.
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/usmca-where-things-stand.
2 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Coming North American Digital Trade Zone, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/coming-north-american-digital-trade-zone (observing that "the TPP is dead, long
live the TPP").
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arrangements rather than global regimes. Finally, we offer an assessment of current efforts to use
trade treaties to resolve cybersecurity and digital trade challenges.
II.

Digital Trade and Cybersecurity Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements

Most industries rely on the movement of data to at least some degree.3 Digital trade and
cybersecurity provisions in trade agreements can thus have a widespread impact even beyond the
obvious industries (internet platforms, e-commerce firms, online financial and payment services,
computer services, and logistics firms).'
The idea of incorporating explicit cybersecurity provisions into international trade deals
gained traction with the TPP, which was originally negotiated by the United States and eleven
Pacific Rim countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei,
Singapore, and New Zealand). Russia and China have never been part of this framework. The TPP,
which the United States ultimately abandoned, devotes a chapter to electronic commerce.' Article
14.16 (Cooperation on Cybersecurity Measures) affirms the importance of-but does not create
concrete obligations for-"building the capabilities of their national entities responsible for
computer security incident response" and "using existing collaboration mechanisms to cooperate
to identify and mitigate malicious intrusions or dissemination of malicious code that affect the
electronic networks" of the parties.6
Digital trade provisions of USMCA implement a "risk-based" approach to cybersecurity
that may offer a path forward for at least the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This approach
would rely on consensus-based standards and risk management best practices to identify and
protect against cybersecurity risks and to detect, respond to, and recover from cybersecurity events.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the digital trade provisions of USMCA echo the TPP's call to strengthen
existing mechanisms for cooperating to identify and mitigate malicious intrusions that affect
electronic networks. Unlike the TPP (which includes a greater number of parties, including several
Asian countries), USMCA provisions contemplate use of those mechanisms to address
cybersecurity incidents, as well as the sharing of information for awareness and best practices.
To date, regional agreements such as the CPTPP and USMCA have offered the clearest
templates for reconciling digital trade facilitation with protections to consumers and core security
interests. Yet, complications can arise even in arrangements among friends. For example, when
it comes to intelligence cooperation, some have suggested that aspects of intelligence-sharing
among the "Five Eyes" could become more complicated if some members embrace a more open

3 U.S.-Mexico-Canada

Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors, Inv.
No. TPA 105-003, USITC Pub. 4889, 171-72, n.412 (Apr. 2019) (Final).
' Along with provisions on digital trade, USMCA includes a chapter on telecommunications that governs access to
networks, and a chapter on financial services that contains provisions on electronic payments.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership Ch. 14, Feb. 4, 2016; see Mark Wu, Digital
Trade-RelatedProvisionsin Regional TradeAgreements: Existing Models and Lessonsfor the MultilateralTrade
System, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., at 6 (Nov. 2017), http://el5initiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-Mark-Wu-Final.pdf.
6 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 5.
7See Wu, supra note 5, at 7 (describing the variety of e-commerce provisions in regional trade agreements).
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approach towards Chinese-manufactured and developed equipment,' even if they commit to
excluding such equipment from "sensitive" parts of their networks.9
The USMCA provides for increased consumer protection by requiring that each party adopt
or maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection of the personal information of the
users of digital trade. Chapter 19 specifies principles and guidelines that should underlie this
framework: limitation on collection; choice; data quality; purpose specification; use limitation;
security safeguards; transparency; individual participation; and accountability.1 0 From the
perspective of consumers, the most direct impact of Chapter 19 may be its provisions restricting
the imposition of certain taxes, which will largely guarantee tax-free transfers of movies, e-books,
and videos throughout the United States, Mexico and Canada. The agreement also establishes that
platforms cannot be held liable for the actions of content producers, and it prohibits businesses
from requiring that data be stored domestically." Such anti-data-localization provisions also have
implications for law enforcement, which increasingly confronts issues relating to cross-border
access to digital evidence.12 Public and private sector interests are increasingly interrelated because
so much of our collective activity takes place on the same basic platforms.
III.

National Security, International Trade and Cybersecurity

Just as trade and commerce have become increasingly digital, so too have elements of
United States critical infrastructure.1 3 The potential national security implications of policies that
facilitate access to domestic networks and markets make this area susceptible to competing
pressures. 14 For example, the Trump Administration and Congress view Chinese
telecommunications as a profound threat to United States security, especially with respect to the
design and deployment of 5G standards and systems.1 5
Although trade agreements have traditionally included some form of carve-out for
measures deemed necessary to a country's "essential security," the pervasiveness of digital
technology opens the door to expansive interpretations of this exception and what some have called

8Intel Brief, Could Huawei Signal the End of the "FiveEyes"?, CIPHER BRIEF (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.thecipherbrief com/columnarticle/could-huawei-signal-the-end-of-the-five-eyes.
9 Michael Holden & Jack Stubbs, Five Eyes Will Not Use Huawei in Sensitive Networks: Senior U.S. Official, REUTERS
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-huawei-ncsc-usa/five-eyes-will-not-use-huawei-insensitive-networks-senior-us-official-idUSKCN1SO1CZ.
10 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Ch. 19, Nov. 30, 2018.
1 Jessica Vomiero, Here's What You Need to Know About CUSMVL4 andDigital Trade, GLOBAL NEWS (Apr. 14, 2019),
https://globalnews.ca/news/51663 15/cusma-digital-trade-google/.
12 Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Promoting Public Safety, Privacy and the Rule of Law Around the World
(Apr. 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153446/download.
13 See generally About CISA, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY,
https://www.cisa.gov/about-cisa.
14 See Kathleen Claussen, Beyond Norms: Using InternationalEconomic Tools to DeterMalicious State-Sponsored
CyberActivities, 32 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 113, 115 (2018) (Kathleen Claussen has explored the potential for
international economic tools to address certain malicious cyber activities by other states.).
15 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Current, Former Pentagon Leaders Sound Alarm on Chinese Technology in 5G
Networks, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/current-fonnerpentagon-leaders-sound-alann-on-chinese-technology-in-5g-networks/2019/04/02/d74f2bfe-54ab-1 1e9-9136f8e636flf6df story.html?utm ter=-.43dl 8a2c27dc.
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a new "digital protectionism." 16 Even good-faith measures designed to reduce the risk of importing
devices programmed with, or vulnerable to, malicious code can create barriers to trade. Moreover,
just as the United States' introduction of self-judging essential security interest clauses into its
bilateral investment agreements led to an overall increase in the inclusion of this type of clause in
bilateral investment treaties around the world, " cybersecurity provisions in United States trade
agreements could have a similar demonstration effect. Although some have argued that the existing
World Trade Organization (WTO) framework governing Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) could
be used to assess national cybersecurity measures ostensibly adopted for legitimate purposes," the
current trend suggests that more specific negotiated language will ultimately supply the rules for
digital trade and related flows of technology and data, as illustrated above.
Concerns about national security threats from international trade have grown sharply under
the Trump Administration and reached a fever pitch over issues relating to China's leading
telecommunication company's violation of sanctions related to Iran and North Korea.19 The
flashpoint has been the United States government's treatment of China's leading
telecommunications company, Huawei, and China's second largest telecommunications
equipment maker, ZTE. In April 2018, the United States Commerce Department generally banned
supply to ZTE of items that were made in or have other connections to the United States after
United States authorities found that ZTE violated United States' sanctions prohibiting most sales
of such items to North Korea and Iran. The Trump Administration brokered a deal to levy a $1
billion fine on the company in lieu of the ban (in addition to earlier criminal and civil penalties).2 0
Many members of Congress expressed disappointment in the lifting of the ZTE sanctions and
threatened to reverse the action legislatively. While there was no legislative reversal, Congress
included in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2019 a variety of
cybersecurity-related provisions aimed largely at ZTE, Huawei and other Chinese
telecommunications companies. 2 1 For example, Section 889 of the NDAA instructs the executive
branch not to procure telecommunications equipment or services from Huawei or ZTE.22 (Huawei
is challenging this provision in United States court.2 3

Ziyang Fan & Anil Gupta, The Dangers of Digital Protectionism, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/08/the-dangers-of-digital-protectionism.
" Karl P. Sauvant & Mevelyn Ong, The Rise of Self-Judging Essential Security Interest Clauses in International
Investment
Agreements,
COLUM.
FDI
PERS.
No.
188,
1
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2881703&download=yes.
18 See Alberto Oddenino, Digital Standardization, Cybersecurity Issues and InternationalTrade Law, Questions of
International Law, 51 QUESTIONS OF INT'L L. 31, 37 (May 31, 2018), http://www.qil-qdi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/03_Data-Protection_-ODDENINO_FIN.pdf.
19 See, e.g., Charles Arthur, Huawei, Sanctions and Software: Everything You Need to Know, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/dec/08/huawei-sanctions-software-what-you-need-to-know.
20 Will Knight, ZTE May Have Been Saved, But Its PlightCould Strengthen China's Tech Ambitions, MIT TECH. REV.
(June 7, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/611382/zte-may-have-been-saved-but-its-plight-couldstrengthen-chinas-tech-ambitions/.
21 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636
(2018).
22 Id.
23
See Quinta Jurecic, Document: Huawei Lawsuit Against United States, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-huawei-lawsuit-against-united-states.
16
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There was major escalation in 2019, when the Trump Administration sanctioned Huawei
in response to alleged Iran embargo violations. In May 2019, the Commerce Department added
Huawei and Huawei affiliates in twenty-six countries to the Export Administration Regulations'
"Entity List." 24 Entity List rules generally forbid United States and non-United States companies
from supplying to designated Huawei entities equipment, software and technology that originated
in the United States, in whole or significant part, or that have certain other connections to the
United States. These restrictions have substantially undermined international trade relating to
telecommunications systems, particularly as they relate to the supply of semiconductor devices
and designs. Chinese authorities have, in turn, threatened similar restraints on business with the
United States.2 5 While the United States has taken the most extreme approach, the United Kingdom
and others have made findings that call the reliability of Huawei systems into question. These
developments have occasioned major uncertainty and inefficiencies as countries struggle to move
fully into the 5G era. The Huawei saga represents a particularly extreme example of the challenges
governments and businesses will continue to face as trade issues and cybersecurity concerns
increasingly intersect.
Given the specter of cybersecurity concerns connected to protecting national security and
critical infrastructure, provisions regarding access to source code can provide a sticking point in
digital trade negotiations. On the one hand, companies and countries require confidence that the
code running on their systems has been checked for vulnerabilities and potentially malicious
components. On the other hand, demands for access to source code can provide cover for state
appropriation of proprietary technology. The European Commission has addressed this issue in
part by promoting an open source software strategy and promulgating an open source software
license (EUPL) to facilitate the sharing and reuse of software developed by public
administrations.2 6 In 2015, Vint Cerf and 260 experts urged the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to require all manufacturers of Wi-Fi devices to make their source code
"publicly available and regularly maintained," pointing to "[t]he recent Volkswagen scandal with
uninspected computer code that cheated emissions testing" as proof that this is "a real concern." 2 7
Zeynep Tufekci of the University of North Carolina proposed in The New York Times in response
to the Volkswagen debacle that we create "special commissions with full access to the code under
regulatory supervision" to balance commercial interests and public safety in the Internet of
Things. 28 Theodore Moran of Georgetown University authored a policy brief in 2013 advocating
for the creation of a "multilateral nondiscriminatory procedure . . . for vetting IT goods and
services-and patches and upgrades-from supply chains that originate anywhere in the world." 2 9
Addition of Entities to the Entity List, 84 Fed. Reg. 22961 (May 21, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 744).
See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson & Paul Mozur, China Steps Up Trade War and PlansBlacklist of U.S. Firms, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/3 1/business/china-list-us-huawei-retaliate.html.
26
See
generally
Open
Source
Software
Strategy,
EUR.
COMM'N,
(explaining the European
https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments/infonatics/open-source-software-strategyen
Union's updated strategy for internal use of open source software).
27 Darlene Storm, Vint Cerf and 260 Experts Give FCC a Plan to Secure Wi-Fi Routers, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 14,
2015), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2993112/vint-cerf-and-260-experts-give-fcc-a-plan-to-secure-wi-firouters.html.
28 Zeynep Tufekci,
Volkswagen and the Era of Cheating Software, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/opinion/volkswagen-and-the-era-of-cheating-software.html?_r-0.
29 Theodore H. Moran, Dealingwith Cybersecurity Threats Posed by Globalized Information Technology Suppliers,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., at 1 (May 2013), https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pbl311.pdf (also praising Chinese company Huawei's existing security assurance program, which offers to place all source
24
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In contrast to these code-sharing proposals, article 14.17 of the TPP (now CPTPP)
precludes treaty parties from requiring "the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned
by a person of another [TPP] Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such
software, or of products containing such software, in its territory."3 0 This provision relates only to
"mass-market software or products containing such software" and does not include software used
for "critical infrastructure." 3 1 Annex 8-B on technical barriers to trade also provides that, with
respect to information and communications technology products that use cryptography and are
designed for commercial applications, "no Party shall impose or maintain a technical regulation or
conformity assessment procedure that requires a manufacturer or supplier of the product, as a
condition of the manufacture, sale, distribution, import or use of the product" to provide a private
key or other encryption backdoor (although the agreement does not prevent a party's law
enforcement authorities from requiring service providers that use encryption they control to
provide unencrypted communications to law enforcement agencies "pursuant to that Party's legal
procedures").3 2
The CPTPP therefore leaves it to businesses to negotiate source code verification
provisions, if any, on a contract-by-contract basis, but it precludes the government of a state party
to the agreement from mandating access to source code. Under this framework, providing access
to source code for "mass-market software" cannot be a prerequisite for gaining access to a foreign
market. Moreover, as indicated above, China, Russia, and the United States remain outside this
framework.
Given the current geopolitical climate, the question remains whether an intermediate
solution might be possible for source code inspection. IBM and Microsoft both experienced
criticism in 2015 for agreeing to let the Chinese government review some of their proprietary code
in a secure setting.33 They, along with Intel, were among the most vocal opponents of China's plan
to require foreign technology companies to provide the government with access to proprietary
source code.3 4 During the same period, Apple reportedly refused China's requests for its source
code.3 5 Meanwhile, companies including IBM, Hewlett-Packard, McAfee, Cisco, and the German
company SAP agreed to use intermediary companies to allow the source code for their products to
be inspected under requirements imposed by Russia's Federal Security Service.3 6

code in escrow to a trusted third party for verification; Moran is a member of Huawei's International Advisory

Council).
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 5.
Id.
32 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 8-B,
Feb. 4, 2016.
33 See Theodore H. Moran, Should US Tech Companies Share Their "Source Code" with China?, PETERSON INST.
FOR INT'L ECON. (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/should-us-tech-companiesshare-their-source-code-china.
34 See Bogdan Popa, Microsoft, Intel, Others Oppose China's Plans to Get Access to Source Code, SOFTPEDIA NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2016), https:/news.softpedia.com/news/microsoft-intel-others-oppose-china-plans-to-get-access-to-sourcecode-510723.shtml.
35 See Dustin Volz, Apple Refused China Request for Source Code in Last Two Years: Lawyer, REUTERS (Apr. 19,
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-idUSKCNOXG28Z.
36 See Greg Price, U.S. Tech Companies Give Russia Secretive Source Codes to Stay in Multibillion-DollarMarket,
NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-us-tech-source-code-628589.
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In 2015, Stewart Baker expressed doubt that the prohibition on mandating access to source
code in the TPP would have much impact given the carve-out for critical infrastructure, since
"there's very little mass market software that doesn't run on computers involved in critical
infrastructure." 3 7 In addition, even though the provisions on electronic commerce do not apply to
government procurement, commercial software could well end up on products used by government
employees (as Baker wrote, "I doubt US security agencies are comfortable letting Vietnam write
apps that end up on the phones of their employees without the ability to inspect the source."38
This seems to leave no option but domestic development of software for critical infrastructure, or
that might be used in government systems. However, a report by the United Kingdom Intelligence
and Security Committee titled ForeignInvolvement in the CriticalNational Infrastructure; The
implicationsfor nationalsecurity observed that "[a]ny policy which seeks to block all Chinese
companies from any future contracts relating to [Critical National Infrastructure] projects is not
only impractical but, crucially, given the predominance of Chinese-manufactured and -developed
equipment, is unlikely to result in the national security protection envisaged." 3 9 Current United
States policy appears to be testing this proposition, as indicated above.
IV.

Globalization, Regionalization, or Privatization?

As companies seek legal frameworks for conducting digital business on a global scale,
factors continue to push in the direction of regionalized or localized rules. The specter has emerged
of a division of the world between United States and Chinese cyber standards and communities of
suppliers, particularly for 5G. The Trump Administration is reportedly contemplating requiring
that 5G cellular technology deployed in the United States be made outside of China.4 0 At the same
time, United States sanctions are blocking Huawei's access to semiconductor devices and designs
that are critical to 5G, such as re-programmable integrated circuits supplied by Xilinx and Intel.4 1
In the absence of a coordinated approach to cybersecurity and digital trade among
governments, companies are embarking on their own initiatives. For example, Siemens AG and
others have developed a Charter of Trust on cybersecurity, whose principles include promoting
"multilateral collaborations in regulation and standardization to set a level playing field matching
the global reach of [the] WTO" and "inclusion of rules for cybersecurity into Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs)."4 2 Microsoft has urged the need for a Digital Geneva Convention to curb
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https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/205680/ISCReport-Foreign-Investment-in-the-Critical-National-Infrastructure.pdf.
40 Leslie Jones, Trump AdministrationMulls Requiring 5G Equipmentfor Domestic Use to be Manufactured
Outside of China: WSJ, CNBC (June 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/23/us-considers-requiring-5gequipment-for-domestic-be-made-outside-of-china-wsj.html.
41 See, e.g., John Kennedy, Intel, Qualcomm, Xilinx and Broadcom Join Trump's Ban on Huawei,
SILICONREPUBLIC.COM(May 21, 2019), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/companies/huawei-intel-xilinx-qualcommbroadcom-google-trump-ban.
42 Charterof Trust, SIEMENS https://new.siemens.com/global/en/company/topicareas/digitalization/cybersecurity.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
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states' malicious activities in cyberspace. 43 Ambassador Robert Holleyman, who led the creation
of a new Digital Trade Working Group within USTR, has urged the United States to secure "21st
Century rules for digital trade and data flows" in any new trade agreement with the European
Union,4 4 and former Commerce Department General Counsel Cam Kerry, responding to
Holleyman, has called digital trade provisions "a gain lost by walking away from TTP and TTIP."4 5
The ratification and implementation of the digital trade provisions of USMCA may provide some
indication as to the feasibility of international commercial agreements in this area, while the
ongoing trade war with China suggests that such solutions are not likely to achieve global reach.
In a better world, the United States and its trading partners would negotiate treaty
arrangements that resolve with certainty and clarity the circumstances in which national
governments can restrict digital trade for national security reasons. That would have been a tall
order even in the halcyon post-World War II years in which the United States and its allies were
far more prepared to cooperate on the intersection between international trade and national
security. In current conditions, however, there seems to be little hope for multilateral treatment of
a topic as charged with controversy as digital trade and national security. The USMCA, if it comes
into effect, contains some promising language, but it does not offer a template for effective
solutions on a broader scale.
The future, then, appears to lie largely with contractual arrangements among private parties
that anticipate and account for national security-related disruption as best they can. Challenges
such as United States sanctions against Huawei and ZTE are unlikely to dissipate anytime soon.
As J. Benton Heath has cautioned, "[i]t is unclear whether our international economic systems
have the legal tools, the capacity, or the legitimacy" to address the increasing entanglement
between national security policy, including cybersecurity, and "ordinary" economic regulation.4 6
The geographic fragmentation of digital supply chains is well underway.4 7 Paradoxically, our
increasing digital interconnectedness and interdependence could prompt the creation of regulatory
barriers to cooperation that are as impermeable, if not more so, than physical ones.

Creatinga Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT, https://news.microsoft.com/cloudforgood/policy/briefingpapers/trusted-cloud/creating-digital-geneva-convention.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
" Robert Holleyman (@RHolleyman), TWITTER (Jul. 25, 2018, 2:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/RHolleyman/status/1022227416171700224.
1 Cam Kerry (@cam kerry), TWITTER (Jul. 25, 2018, 2:33 PM),
https://twitter.com/cam-kerry/status/1022233474139389952.
46 J. Benton Heath, National Security and Economic Globalization: Toward Collision or Reconciliation?, 42
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1431, 1432 (2019), https://www.fordhamilj.org/volume-42-issue-5/2019/5/24/nationalsecurity-and-economic-globalization-toward-collision-or-reconciliation.
1 See Debby Wu, Trump Tumult Has Gadget GiantsSplitting Along U.S.-China Lines, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-14/the-world-s-gadget-makers-are-splitting-along-u-schinese-lines.
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